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Non-­‐Technical	  Summary	  
With	  about	  600	  cases	  per	  year	  Germany	  is	  the	  most	  active	  country	  in	  Europe	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	   patent	   litigation	   trials.	   These	   trials,	   usually	   initiated	   by	   a	   patentee	   suspecting	   the	  
infringement	   of	   his	   patent	   by	   another	   firm,	   are	   aimed	   at	   delivering	   a	   judgment	   about	  
whether	  the	  infringement	  took	  place.	  	  If	  the	  court	  rules	  that	  there	  is	  an	  infringement	  it	  bans	  
future	   infringement	   and	   decides	   about	   appropriate	   damage	   awards	   to	   be	   paid	   to	   the	  
patentee.	   	   The	  most	   striking	   fact	   about	   these	   patent	   litigation	   trials	   is	   that-­‐	   even	   though	  
initiated	  to	  obtain	  a	  ruling	  on	  the	  dispute-­‐	  about	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  cases	  never	  reach	  a	  final	  
judgment.	   They	   are	   either	   withdrawn	   bilaterally	   or	   unilaterally	   or	   dropped	   because	   the	  
counterparties	   have	   reached	   a	   private	   settlement	   agreement.	   From	   a	   theoretical	   point	   of	  
view	   this	   is	   astonishing	   as	   a	   settlement	   agreement	   is	   also	   possible	   prior	   to	   trial,	   without	  
incurring	  any	  (sometimes	  very	  costly)	  lawyer	  and	  litigation	  expenses.	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   is	   therefore	   to	   investigate	  why	   and	  under	  which	   conditions	   the	  
plaintiff	   and	   defendant	   decide	   to	   not	   go	   for	   a	   judgment,	   but	   to	   deal	   out	   some	   private	  
settlement	  arrangement	  after	  having	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  courts.	  	  	  
The	  study	   is	  conducted	  using	  a	  unique,	  hand-­‐collected	  database	  compiled	  at	   the	  ZEW	  that	  
contains	   detailed	   information	   about	   roughly	   80	   percent	   of	   all	   patent	   litigation	   cases	   in	  
Germany	  between	  2000	  and	  2008.	  	  
Theoretical	   models	   from	   the	   law	   and	   economics	   literature	   suggest	   that	   asymmetries	   in	  
information	  and	  stakes	  drive	  parties	  to	  choose	  trial	  rather	  than	  a	  settlement	  deal.	  Applying	  
this	  reasoning	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  settle	  or	  not	  after	  having	  filed	  a	  court	  case	  we	  argue	  that	  
parties	  will	  deviate	  from	  their	  decision	  to	  obtain	  a	  judgment	  only	  if	  the	  asymmetries	  change	  
during	  trial	   in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  a	  settlement	  deal	  more	  attractive.	   	  Our	  results	  show	  that,	  
indeed,	   changes	   in	   information	   and	   stakes	   arising	   after	   the	   filing	   of	   the	   court	   case	   can	  
increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  settlement.	  If	  an	  expert	  is	  called	  upon	  by	  the	  judges	  to	  deliver	  an	  
expertise	   about	   the	   technical	   details	   of	   the	   infringement	   the	   informational	   asymmetries	  
between	  plaintiff	  and	  defendant	  reduce,	  aligning	  their	  estimates	  about	  their	  prospect	  at	  trial	  
and	  making	  a	  settlement	  agreement	  more	  attractive	  for	  both.	  If	  the	  stakes	  for	  one	  or	  both	  of	  
the	   parties	   suddenly	   increase	   during	   trial	   through	   the	   setting	   of	   a	   very	   high	   value	   of	   the	  
dispute	  by	   the	   judges	  or	   through	   the	   filing	  of	  a	  nullity	   suit	  by	   the	  defendant	   that	   severely	  
threatens	   the	  monopoly	   right	   of	   the	   patentee,	   the	   parties	   also	   recalculate	   their	   expected	  
payoff	  from	  trial.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  under	  these	  new	  conditions	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
conclude	  that	  settlement	  is	  the	  better	  option.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  changes	  invoked	  during	  trial	  proceedings	  we	  find	  the	  general	  willingness	  
to	  settle	  rather	  than	  wait	  for	  a	  judgment	  to	  depend	  on	  overall	  firm	  specific-­‐stakes,	  strategies	  
and	   the	   firm’s	   confidence	   in	   the	   case.	   Firms	  with	   overall	   higher	   stakes	   in	   the	   case,	  more	  
confidence	   in	   winning	   and	   the	   strategy	   to	   obtain	   a	   stable	   judgment	   at	   a	   highly	   accepted	  
court	  are	  generally	  less	  likely	  to	  change	  their	  mind	  and	  deal	  out	  a	  settlement	  agreement.	  	  
Das	  Wichtigste	  in	  Kürze	  
Mit	   ungefähr	   600	   Fällen	   pro	   Jahr	   ist	   Deutschland	   das	   Land	   in	   Europa	   mit	   den	   meisten	  
Patentverletzungsprozessen.	  Diese	  Prozesse	  werden	  meist	  von	  Patentinhabern	   initiiert,	  die	  
eine	   Verletzung	   ihres	   Patents	   durch	   eine	   andere	   Firma	   vermuten	   und	   dies	   gerichtlich	  
bestätigt	   und	   sanktioniert	   haben	   wollen.	   Wenn	   das	   Gericht	   eine	   Verletzung	   des	   Patents	  
bestätigt,	   wird	   diese	   untersagt	   und	   eine	   Schadensersatzzahlung	   an	   den	   Patentinhaber	  
festgelegt.	  	  Unerwarteterweise	  kommt	  es	  bei	  ca.	  60	  Prozent	  der	  Fälle	  gar	  nicht	  erst	  zu	  einem	  
Urteil,	  weil	  sich	  die	  beteiligten	  Parteien	  	  nach	  Beginn	  des	  Prozesses	  vergleichen	  oder	  den	  Fall	  
einseitig	  oder	  beidseitig	   fallen	   lassen.	  Aus	  theoretischer	  Sicht	   ist	  dies	  überraschend,	  da	  ein	  
Vergleich	   auch	   vor	  der	   Eröffnung	  eines	  Prozesses	  möglich	   gewesen	  wäre	  und	  die	   (oftmals	  
teuren)	  Prozess-­‐	  und	  Anwaltskosten	  hätten	  vermieden	  werden	  können.	  	  
Das	   Ziel	   dieser	   Studie	   ist	   daher	   herauszuarbeiten	  warum	  und	  unter	  welchen	  Bedingungen	  
der	   Kläger	   und	   der	   Beklagte	   sich	   nach	   Eröffnung	   des	   Prozesses	   dazu	   entschließen	   auf	   ein	  
Urteil	  zu	  verzichten	  und	  sich	  anstatt	  dessen	  zu	  vergleichen.	  	  Dazu	  werten	  wir	  einen	  am	  ZEW	  
erstellten,	  einmaligen	  Datensatz	  aus,	  der	  detaillierte	   Informationen	   zu	   ca.	  80	  Prozent	  aller	  
Patentverletzungsfälle	  in	  Deutschland	  von	  2000	  bis	  2008	  enthält.	  	  
Theoretische	  Modelle	  aus	  dem	  Bereich	  der	  ökonomischen	  Analyse	  des	  Rechts	  zeigen,	  dass	  
asymmetrische	   Information	   und	   asymmetrische	   Einsätze	   dazu	   führen,	   dass	   die	   beteiligten	  
Parteien	   einen	   Gerichtsprozess	   beginnen	   anstatt	   sich	   außergerichtlich	   zu	   vergleichen.	  
Wendet	  man	  diese	  Argumentation	  auch	  auf	  die	  Entscheidung	  an	  einen	  Prozess	  zu	  Ende	  zu	  
führen	   oder	   vorher	   durch	   einen	   Vergleich	   zu	   beenden,	   ergibt	   sich,	   dass	   im	   Prozess	  
stattfindende	   Veränderungen	   der	   Asymmetrien	   dazu	   führen	   können,	   dass	   die	   beteiligten	  
Parteien	   von	   ihrer	   ursprünglichen	   Strategie	   abweichen	   und	   sich	   für	   einen	   Vergleich	  
entscheiden.	  	  Unsere	  Ergebnisse	  bestätigen	  dies.	  So	  führt	  zum	  Beispiel	  das	  Hinzuziehen	  eines	  
Sachverständigen	   durch	   die	   Richter	   dazu,	   dass	   sich	   der	   Informationsstand	   der	   beteiligten	  
Parteien	   und	   somit	   deren	   Erwartungen	   an	   den	   Ausgang	   des	   Prozesses	   angleichen.	   Dies	  
steigert	   die	   Attraktivität	   und	   dadurch	   die	   Wahrscheinlichkeit	   eines	   Vergleiches.	   Auch	   der	  
Einsatz	  einer	  oder	  beider	  beteiligter	  Parteien	  kann	  sich	  während	  des	  Prozesses	  verändern:	  
Das	   Setzen	   eines	   hohen	   Streitwertes	   durch	   die	   Richter	   oder	   die	   Einreichung	   einer	  
Nichtigkeitsklage	  beim	  Bundespatentgericht,	  die	  das	  Monopol	  des	  Patentinhabers	  gefährdet,	  
erhöhen	  das	  Risiko	  im	  Vergleich	  zur	  vorherigen	  Situation.	  Die	  führt	  dazu,	  dass	  ein	  Vergleich	  
als	  Möglichkeit	  wieder	  in	  Betracht	  gezogen	  wird	  und	  die	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  eines	  Vergleichs	  
steigt.	  
Zusätzlich	  zeigen	  unsere	  Ergebnisse,	  dass	  die	  generelle	  Neigung	  sich	  während	  des	  Prozesses	  
doch	   noch	   für	   einen	   Vergleich	   zu	   entscheiden	   stark	   von	   firmenspezifischen	   Eigenschaften	  
und	  Strategien	  abhängt.	  So	  sind	  vor	  allem	  Firmen	  mit	  insgesamt	  sehr	  hohem	  Einsatz,	  einem	  
hohen	   Vertrauen	   in	   ihre	   Chancen	   vor	   Gericht	   und	  mit	   der	   Strategie	   ein	   stabiles	   Urteil	   zu	  
erzielen	  weniger	  geneigt	  einen	  Vergleich	  in	  Betracht	  zu	  ziehen.	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Abstract
This paper looks at the decision to settle patent litigation in Germany from a new
angle by focusing on detailed data on within-trial actions and motivations by plain-
tiff, defendant and the courts. Using a new dataset covering about 80% of all patent
litigation cases in Germany between 2000 and 2008 we estimate the likelihood of
within-trial settlement. We find that the within-trial settlement decision is to some
degree driven by the proceedings that change the pre-trial setting of the negotia-
tions in terms of information and stakes and make previously refused settlement
a new option. Additionally, firm-specific stakes as measured by the relation of the
involved parties to the disputed patent as well as firm-specific strategies are found
to affect the general willingness to settle after the filing of a court case. The results
suggest that pre-trial failure of settlement negotiations can to some extent be offset
by within-trial settlement through efforts made by court and involved parties, but
that the disposition to settle is to a larger degree determined by firm-specific stakes
and strategies in the case.
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1. Introduction
Patent infringement disputes are an inevitable consequence of the public-good
characteristics of patents and their probabilistic nature originating from fuzzy
property boundaries (Merges and Nelson 1990, Ziedonis 2004, Shapiro 2001). Within
such a dispute the involved parties face the decision between litigation to a court
judgment or a settlement agreement. Even when choosing to go trial about 60
percent of all cases in Germany still settle during trial proceedings while only 40
percent of all cases are adjudicated to a final judgment.
Though recently disputed in economic theory regarding antitrust issues and the
nullification of weak patents (Shapiro 2003) the avoidance of litigation as such
through settlement deals is generally considered welfare-enhancing, as it avoids
costly litigation for both the state and the involved parties.
In search of factors that may trigger the settlemet rate this paper aims at investi-
gating how the decision to settle patent infringement suits in Germany during the
court proceedings is being shaped by different forces. The decision to settle after
having filed a suit at a court seems irrational at first, as settlement could have
been reached beforehand without incurring any litigation expenses. This is how-
ever only true if the information available during court proceedings was already
present before the court filing. During trial new information can be revealed that
can lead to changes in the expectations and stakes of the involved parties and thus
make a settlement decision during the court proceedings more likely. While some
of the changes in information and stakes may be unobservable, other procedures
revealing new information and changing stakes can be observed through entries
in the court records. We find that the likelihood of settlement changes when new
information is revealed in court through expert opinions. In addition to changes
in the informational setting we also find changes in stakes induced by the jurisdic-
tional value set by the judges and the filing of nullity suits at the German Patent
Court during trial to increase the likelihood of settlement. We further find that
parties in general differ with respect to their willingness to overthrow their previ-
ous commitment to litigate, which can be interpreted as different sensitivity in the
reaction to unobservable changes in information and stakes. Parties with higher
overall stakes in the case or higher confidence in winning the case are generally
less willing to settle than those with only relatively little stakes involved.
Our paper is closely related to other empirical studies on patent litigation and
settlement. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2004) study the determinants of US
patent suits by examining the characteristics of litigated patents and their owners,
finding that the value of the patent measured by forward citations and claims in-
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creases the likelihood of litigation. In their 2004 paper, Lanjouw and Schankerman
find that the probability of litigation is significantly higher for individual patent
owners and firms with small patent portfolios. They attribute this to patentees
with large portfolios being more likely to engage in trade of patents or other mea-
sures of dispute resolution. With respect to the likelihood of settlement Lanjouw
and Schankerman find that the main characteristics of patents and their owners
do not affect the probability of settlement after a suit is filed. Cremers (2007)
follows the approach and estimates the determinants of litigation using data on
two major German litigation courts between 1993 and 1995. Similar to Lanjouw
and Schankerman she finds more valuable patents to be more likely to be involved
in patent litigation and smaller firms more likely to be involved in litigation cases.
She further finds that patents having survived an opposition procedure are more
likely to be litigated and that the litigation probability decreases with the port-
folio size of the patentee. Using the same database Cremers (2009) investigates
the settlement decisions in patent infringement suits. She finds legal differences
between the District Courts to have a significant impact on the settlement rates
during trial. She further finds that at later stages of the trial the use of invalidity
suits positively affects the settlement probability while the fact that a patent has
survived an opposition procedure generally increases the settlement probability.
Somaya (2003) uses US litigation data on suits filed between 1983 and 1993 in the
computer and research medicine industry to test the influence of strategic stakes
and the thread of a mutual hold-up on the settlement of patent litigation suits.
Using a model incorporating the selection of disputes into litigation he finds evi-
dence that the size of the strategic stakes of the patentee and defendant negatively
affects the settlement probability. Allison, Lemley and Walker (2010) use Stanford
IP Litigation data in order to test whether repeat patent plaintiffs are more likely
to settle patent disputes. Assuming that these are risk averse, they find that they
are settling more of their cases and take only the very best to trial to avoid getting
their patents invalidated. Weatherall and Jensen (2005) collected data on the en-
tire population of judgments at Australian courts for the period 1997-2003. They
find an extremely small number of patent cases terminating by court judgment and
thereby confirm that a large share of patent cases is settled before a final court
ruling.
This paper builds on the above mentioned contributions, but extends the analysis
by stressing both, factors changing the pre-trial setting and factors affecting the
firm's general willingness to consider deviating from the litigation strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives on overview
on the theoretical background relevant for this paper, linking the literature on the
decision between litigation and pre-trial settlement to considerations on drivers of
within-trial settlement, and discussing firm-specific characteristics and strategies
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in the litigation process. Section 3 contains the empirical setup, starting with the
construction of the database and the descriptive statistics and followed by the es-
timation setup and results in section 4. We conduct several robustness checks in
section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
2. Theoretical considerations on litigation and settlement
2.1. The decision between litigation and settlement
Going to court and bringing an action against an alleged infringer is the final step
in a chain of actions when claiming and enforcing ones patent. When reaching
this stage several selection mechanisms have already taken effect such that cases
going to trial do not represent a random sample of all infringement cases. First
of all the potential infringement must take place, next the potential infringement
needs be detected by the patent owner in order to be considered for trial and
once the potential infringement has been identified the owner can choose between
trying to enforce its rights and ignoring the infringement. Once having decided on
taking action, there are still two options, settlement and litigation. Differentiating
between these two options is crucial, as litigation data only contains information on
those cases actually going to trial - thus ignoring cases where pre-trial negotiations
have succeeded and an agreement has been reached.
Much of the literature on litigation considers the existence of a dispute as given
and then concentrates on the decision to settle the dispute or proceed to trial. In
the theoretical literature on the economic analysis of legal disputes the two op-
tions settlement and trial are considered as the cooperative and non-cooperative
solution of a bargaining game between plaintiff and defendant that is driven by
various asymmetries in information settings and/ or stakes involved.(Cooter and
Rubinfeld 1989). In the absence of asymmetries the cooperative solution is always
superior to trial as settlement does not involve any litigation costs. The party with
higher expected payoffs from litigation could then be compensated by the other
party in the settlement agreement such that none of the parties would be worse
off when going to trial.
The literature usually distinguishes between two types of possible asymmetries -
asymmetric expectations and asymmetric information - and refers to the models
by Priest and Klein (1984) and Bebchuk (1984). Priest and Klein (1984) model the
decision to litigate or to settle as a rational choice based on both parties expecta-
tions of the outcome of the trial. Even if both parties possess the same information
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about their stakes and the court's decision standard they may evaluate the value
of the dispute differently and thus form different win probabilities leading to dif-
ferent expected payoff values of trial. Depending on how far the parties' expected
values of the dispute differ they will either agree to settle (if difference is small)
or litigate (if difference is large). The closer the true value of the dispute to the
court's decision standard (and thus the more uncertain the case) the more likely
the two parties estimation of the value of the case will differ - which then leads
to litigation. Litigation takes place if the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand
(being his expected trial payoff) exceeds the defendant's maximum settlement offer
(being her expected trial payoff).
Bebchuk (1984) studies the settlement decision in a model with asymmetric infor-
mation. While one of the two parties has private information about its probability
of prevailing in trial, the other party only knows the distribution of win probabil-
ities. The uninformed party now makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer based
on his incomplete information. As the settlement offer is only based on the distri-
bution of win probabilities the other party may reject the offer if her actual win
probability differs greatly from the estimated one used in the calculations such
that the expected payoffs from litigation are larger than the settlement amount.
Depending on the stakes and litigation costs of the two parties, the threshold
values for settlement and litigation vary. Waldfogel (1998) summarizes the main
difference between the divergent expectations (DE) and asymmetric information
(AI) models as which party decides upon the selection of cases going to trial. In
the DE models both parties have an incorrect estimate of the case quality and
cases proceed to trial if the plaintiffs estimated win probability is by chance higher
than the estimate of the defendant. Thus both contribute to the selection of cases
for litigation. In AI models to the contrary the decision making is one-sided as the
informed party is the one to decide whether to proceed to trial or to settle.
While these two models treat litigation in general there are some models that par-
ticularly focus on asymmetries in patent disputes: A third type of asymmetries
- asymmetric stakes - is mentioned by Lanjouw and Lerner (1998) and modeled
by Meurer (1989). It can be summarized to one party having more to gain than
the other one has to loose. The bargaining surplus in that case would not suffice
to compensate both parties and settlement negotiations would break down (So-
maya 2003, p.19). Somaya (2003) generalizes asymmetric stakes as "the result of
difficulties in crafting and enforcing negotiated settlement contracts, which stem
from the unique advantages conferred by the litigated patent"( Somaya 2003, p.
19). Meurer (1989) develops a model of patent litigation between a patentee and a
potential infringer. The parties have the choice between litigation and settlement
that consists of a licensing agreement. Licensing is used as a means of avoiding
litigation about the validity of the patent. The likelihood of litigation versus li-
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censing in this model depends on the probability of patent invalidity, information
asymmetries, antitrust policy, and the rules of litigation-cost allocation. Meurer
introduces asymmetries in stakes such that monopoly profits can exceed the overall
settlement profit to be shared by both parties. These differences in stakes can lead
to litigation even when information is symmetric and generally settlement would
be preferred to litigation.
2.2. The mitigation of asymmetries and the decision between within-court set-
tlement and adjudication
Given that the pre-trial and within-trial setting are the same in terms of stakes,
expectations and information, within-trial settlement is irrational as the conditions
under which a settlement deal would be made are the same, but extra court costs
would have to be added to the settlement amount. Under these conditions within-
trial settlement will only be rational if going to court as such is considered a value
by one of the two firms e.g. as signal to the public or possible other infringers. If
this is not the case and within-trial settlement does happen, it must be driven by
changes in stakes, information or expectations that make parties to deviate from
their original litigation strategy. The within-trial settlement decision must thus be
driven by factors that change the initial setting. During trial there are different
possibilities how changes in informational asymmetries affect the involved stakes
and expectations such that settlement becomes an option after all. Based on these
possibilities, hypotheses on the drivers of within-trial settlement can be derived.
After the plaintiff has filed the case the court decides upon the jurisdictional value
of the dispute which reflects an estimation of the value at stake by the judges.
Formally it is the base for the calculation of court cost to be beared by the loosing
party at the end of trial. This jurisdictional value can be regarded as new informa-
tion about the stakes and it should lead to a recalculation of the values involved in
the dispute. The larger this value, the more likely parties will prefer a settlement
to trial.
Hypothesis 1 a): The settlement probability increases with changes in stakes re-
vealed during the court proceedings induced by the setting of a high jurisdictional
value by the court.
If a nullity procedure is filed during trial, most likely as a measure of defense by
the defendant, the stakes for both plaintiff and defendant change as a nullity pro-
cedure may lead to the elimination of a patent leaving both parties without any
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extra profits to exploit from the patent. The threat of losing her patent changes
the patentees' expectations, making a settlement deal, from which she can obtain
a reasonable settlement amount, more attractive.
Hypothesis 1 b): The settlement probability increases with changes in stakes
revealed during the court proceedings through the filing of a nullity suit.
During the court proceeding different actions are possible that change the informa-
tional setting of the case. If the judges do not feel capable of assessing the technical
details of the case they can request an expert opinion of an external expert. By
doing so the dissemination of new information is likely and information asymme-
tries can be reduced for everyone involved. The same is true if the court orders
the questioning of a witness. Note that even though the burden of proof is gener-
ally on the parties, other than in regular civil suits, the judge can actively request
evidence in form of expert opinions and witnesses in order to deepen his own (tech-
nical) understanding of the circumstances. The probability of settlement should
thus rise if informational asymmetries between plaintiff and defendant are reduced.
Hypothesis 2: The settlement probability increases with new information obtained
during the court proceedings which reduces information asymmetries between both
parties. This is reflected in the use of an external expert and the questioning of a
witness by order of the court.
2.3. The role of firm specific stakes and strategies
From the theoretical considerations we expect parties not to be willing to settle
when entering into litigation in the first place, but the decision to nevertheless do
so to be driven by changes in information and stakes arising during trial. While
hypothesis 1 and 2 cover those changes observable from court records it is likely
that other changes are not recorded in the court files. We expect firms to have a
different baseline willingness to settle that comes into play when reacting to new
information revealed in trial. Some firms may in general be more or less willing
to settle due to either their relative certainty regarding the outcome of the case
or due to firm specific characteristics, strategies and competitive settings. Given
the large amount of information available, our database allows to control for such
differences that may account for some of the variation in case outcomes not ex-
plained by observable changes in the case setting.
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Regarding firm specific characteristics there are several factors that might affect
a firm's baseline willingness to settle during trial. First of all the plaintiffs and
defendants relationship to the patent and the resulting stakes at trial need to
be controlled for. The plaintiff can be either the patentee himself, the exclusive
licensee or one of several simple licensees. While usually only the patentee or
unique licensee are allowed to file suit, other licensees can ask the patent holder
for permission to sue as well if they feel sufficiently affected by the infringement.
We expect patentees and unique licensees to be less likely to settle compared to
normal licensees. While normal licensees may be satisfied with a settlement deal
that ensures their business, patentees or unique licensees have a larger interest in
securing their monopoly right.
The defendant in an infringement case is usually a producer or trader, or both.
Given that producers have most likely based their production facility on the dis-
puted technology they will be less likely to settle than traders that can relatively
easy switch to selling different products. The higher the general stakes for the
plaintiff and defendant, the less likely they will deviate from their litigation strat-
egy. We therefore expect the settlement likelihood to decrease if a patentee or a
unique licensee sues instead of a simple licensee and if the defendant is a producer
rather than a trader.
If one party is very optimistic regarding the outcome of the case finding an ac-
ceptable settlement deal for both becomes more difficult as they will request a
higher settlement amount when their win probability is high. This confidence in
the outcome of the case may be reflected in the voluntary provision of evidence by
plaintiff or defendant. The provision of documents or making available a product
for inspection is voluntary as in German patent litigation the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff and defendant.
Hypothesis 3: The settlement probability decreases if one of the parties voluntarily
choses to present evidence.
Interviews with IP lawyers suggest another factor which possibly affects the de-
cision to settle patent litigation. In Germany and the US there are opportunities
for the plaintiffs to chose the forum for litigation. A plaintiff seeking a robust and
stable judgment on the case will thus chose a court with a high reputation that will
deliver a stable judgment. As it is common knowledge among experienced lawyers
in the field of patent litigation that in Germany the District Court in Düsseldorf is
regarded as a pro-patent court with a high reputation of fast and well-recognized
judgments the choice to go to Düsseldorf rather than to Munich or Mannheim is
expected to be correlated with a lower settlement probability.
Hypothesis 4: The settlement probability is lower if the plaintiff chooses Düssel-
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dorf as forum.
3. Data and Variables
Our dataset covers about 80% of all patent litigation cases dealt with in Germany
between 2000 and 2008. These cases comprise all patent litigation cases handled
at the district courts in Mannheim, Munich, and Düsseldorf that are widely rec-
ognized as the most experienced courts in Germany. 1 As there is no centralized
register of patent cases, the data has been collected by going into the archives of
German district courts and manually copying each court record into our database.
Basing the court data collection on a comprehensive template we collected data
on the proceedings of the suit, the parties, and the patent at issue. We gathered
information on the characteristics of the plaintiff and defendant, the date and du-
ration of trial, the subject of the dispute, the claims of the plaintiffs, the evidence
presented and the relationship of the parties to the patent involved in the case.
Our dataset contains 3786 court cases for which we were able to retrieve the patent
numbers of the patents involved. These cases cover 2988 patents. We conduct our
analysis in this paper at the case level, which treats each case as one observation.
When multiple patents are involved in the case we only include patent informa-
tion of the patent that receives the highest number of forward citations into our
analysis as we suppose this patent to be of major interest. After dropping those
cases dealing with preliminary injunctions only and those in which the defendant
is the patent owner, 2517 observations remain which constitute our sample for the
analysis in this paper. 2
The patent number allows to add patent information to our database, using data
from the German Patent Office (DPMA) and the European Patent Office (EPO)
as reported in PATSTAT. Patent information includes information on applica-
tion dates, international patent classifications (IPC), the number of countries the
patent has been applied for as well as forward references. For a subsample of our
cases we were able to match firm information from the firm databases Amadeus
and Mannheim Enterprise Panel for both plaintiffs and defendants. We added firm
size as measured by employees and the NACE revision 2 industry code.
1 The remaining 20% are cases spread over the nine remaining district courts responsible
for patent litigation. As these courts are of minor importance and reputation, we chose
to abstain from collecting data at those courts for cost reasons.
2 Cases with the defendant being the patent owner are not classical infringement suits,
but counter suits asking for a declaration of non-infringement.
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3.1. Variables
Dependent variable
The dependent variable takes one for settlement and zero otherwise. Cases that
settled within or out of court after trial has started as well as dropped cases
are defined as settlement. Dropped and withdrawn cases are included because
interviews with IP lawyers have revealed that parties often drop the case, but do
not notify the court of a private settlement. As a robustness check we repeat the
analysis with a more strict definition of settlement that only considers those cases
as settled that actually report a settlement. The results are not affected by this
choice.
Main Explanatory variables
Changing information and stakes are represented by several variables: external
expert takes the value one when the judges order the expertise of an external
expert, witness takes the value one when judges chose to hear a witness, value
at stake fixed by the judges during suit, and the filing of a nullity suit during
trial. 3
Firm-specific stakes and strategies are measured by the following variables: Plain-
tiff patentee or exclusive licensee indicates that the plaintiff is the patentee
or an exclusive licensee, compared to the other option being a simple licensee.
Defendant producer indicates that the defendant is a producer, compared to
the other option being a trader. Evidence document takes the value one when
parties chose to provide a document to support their case and exhibit evidence on
the infringing activities. Evidence inspection takes the value one when parties
voluntarily brought an object for inspection to prove their case. Three court vari-
ables Mannheim, Munich and Düsseldorf court stand for the district courts
at which the trial took place.
Control variables
In order to make sure we do not omit important factors that might drive the
settlement decision during trial we include a set of control variables, covering in-
formation on trial, parties and the involved patent. As trial information we include
the age of the patent at trial measured as difference between application data
and trial date, the number of previous trials involving the patent as ob-
served in the period 2000-2008, and the number of patents involved in
3 The variable takes the value one when the court record reveals that a nullity suit has
been filed during trial. Note that these numbers may not be exhaustive. We are currently
working on obtaining data on all nullity suits at the German Patent Court in order to
double check the information from the court records. Therefore we cannot include the
decision of the Federal Patent Court on the merits of the annulment.
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the case. The variable missing value at stake indicates that for that particular
case no value at stake has been named. The reason for this is most likely that these
cases deal with claims not aimed at damage payments, but rather other claims such
as the disclosure of information about potential infringing activities. We expect
a missing value at stake to be correlated with a higher settlement likelihood as
it indicates that the stakes the parties have in this particular trial are rather low
compared to those cases dealing with damage awards. Regarding the involved par-
ties we control for the relative EPO patent stock of plaintiff and defendant
calculated with a depreciation rate of 15%, the number of plaintiffs firms and
the number of defendant firms as well as 4 dummies indicating individuals
suing individuals, individuals suing firms, firms suing individuals and
firms suing firms. The number of previous trials involving plaintiff and
defendant is included as a measure of their experience in court. We further in-
clude variables for Germans vs. Germans cases, those cases involving only non
Germans vs. non Germans and those involving Germans vs. non Germans.
For the subsample of cases for which we were able to match both plaintiffs and
defendants to the Amadeus database we control for the number of employees of
plaintiff and defendant as measured in 1000 employees and the relative size
of the plaintiff compared to the defendant as measured by number of employees
of the plaintiff divided by the number of employees of the defendant. The variable
same industry indicates whether plaintiff and defendant are active in the same
industry as measured by a 21 industry classification derived from NACE revision
2 codes that can be found in the appendix.
We expect that the within-trial settlement probability is not related to the direct
value of the patent as information on patent value is already available prior to
trial. Since all publicly available information about the patent and the involved
products are known and used for the decision to settle prior to filing a litigation
suit, we expect the likelihood of litigation as such to positively depend on the
value correlates of the patent, but not the decision to settle once having entered
trial. 4 We nevertheless include established patent value measures into the estima-
tion. The application type can be an application at the German Patent Office
(DPMA), an international application filed at the DPMA (DPMA -PCT), an
application at the European Patent Office (EPO), or an international application
filed at the EPO (EPO -PCT). The forward citations of the litigated patent
are calculated by summing up all non-self citations to the patent received 5 . If a
patent receives citations from subsequent patents it can be seen as an indicator of
4 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
5 We do not constrain the citations to the date of litigation as we use this measure
for both the litigated patents and a control group of non litigated patents used in the
robustness checks.
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the patent's contribution to the existing stock of knowledge. Several studies have
shown that the monetary value of a patent can to some extent explained by its
forward citations (Trajtenberg 1990, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001)). Following
Graham and Harhoff (2006) we measure the citing patents at the patent family
level, such that two patents sharing the exact same set of priority documents are
counted as one patent family. 6 The share of self-forward citations is calculated
by summing up all self citations to the patent received and calculating the share of
self-citations in all forward citations. This measure indicates the patents' impor-
tance for further research of a patentee and thus how much he builds on his own
inventions. 7 The family size denotes the number of countries for which the patent
has been applied for. The patent breadth denotes the number of unique 3-digit
IPC-classes covered by the patent. The more unique classes covered the broader
the possible application of the patent. In order to capture differencec across tech-
nology classes we include the ISI-classification of the IPC-classes that results in six
general technology areas. One patent can appear in several technology areas.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
We start by comparing the settled and non-settled court cases in table 2. The
overall settlement rate is 62.3 percent. With respect to factors expected to change
the pre-trail setting of the case we find the jurisdictional value of the case set by
the judges to be significantly higher for settled cases and the filing of a nullity suit
during trial to coincide with a significantly higher settlement rate. With respect
to evidence requested by the judges to improve their knowledge of the case we
find settled cases other than expected to exhibit a lower share of cases using a
witness (at the 10% significance level) and we observe no difference with respect
the the use of an external expert. Regarding firm specific stakes and strategies
we see that settled cases exhibit a significantly lower share of plaintiffs with high
stakes as measured by a dummy taking the value if the plaintiff is a patentee or an
exclusive licensee. The same can be observed for defendants. Settled cases exhibit
a significantly lower share of defendants classified as producers. These results in-
dicate support for the hypothesis that parties with higher stakes are less willing to
settle compared to lower stakes parties. Looking at the firms confidence in winning
a court case as measured by voluntary providing evidence in form of an object or
a document we find support for the hypothesis that high confidence coincides with
a lower settlement rate. In 21.8 percent of the cases that do not settle during trial
parties make use of a document as evidence, compared to only 7.1 percent of the
6 This correction is done using the table "docdb family" in PATSTAT.
7 We use the "docstd name" of the patentee to identify self-citations.
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cases that settle. In 9.5 percent of the adjudicated cases the parties make use of an
object inspection as evidence, compared to only 2.4 percent of the settled cases.
Regarding the choice of forum by the plaintiff we find significant differences in
the settlement rate across courts as displayed in table 1. The lowest settlement
rate can be found in Düsseldorf with 59.8 percent of all cases settling, followed
by Mannheim with a settlement rate of 66.5 percent and Munich with a rate of
70.1 percent. The control variables indicate that settled cases involve more claims,
more patents per case and patents that are litigated significantly more often than
non-settled cases. With respect to the involved firms we find that the share of fre-
quent litigators is significantly higher for settled than non-settled cases and that
cases involving foreign firm on one or both sides settle more often. In the rare
event of individuals suing each other the settlement rate is significantly lower than
in cases involving one or more firms. We further find the relative patent stock of
the plaintiff to the defendant to be significantly higher for settled than non- set-
tled cases. The patent value indicators family size, patent breadth and number of
forward citations are significantly higher for the settled cases, raising the question
whether more valuable patents settle more often.
Table 1: Settlement rate across courts
Court Observations Settlement rate
Düsseldorf 1661 59.84%
Mannheim 719 66.48%
Munich 137 70.07%
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Table 2: Descriptives
No Settlement (N=949) Settlement (N=1568)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev ttest
Trial Characteristics
Nr. claims trial 3.69 1.17 3.78 1.21 ∗
Nr. trials involving patent 7.38 29.18 12.92 39.97 ∗ ∗ ∗
Nr. patents in trial 1.13 0.47 1.22 0.83 ∗ ∗ ∗
ln(value at stake) 10.67 4.86 11.70 4.07 ∗ ∗ ∗
Missing value at stake 16.12% 36.79% 9.31% 29.07% ∗ ∗ ∗
Nullity suit 33.83% 47.34% 37.37% 48.39% ∗
Evidence: Witness 4.00% 19.62% 2.42% 15.38% ∗∗
Evidence: External Expert 5.69% 23.18% 5.87% 23.51%
Evidence: document 21.81% 41.32% 7.14% 25.76% ∗ ∗ ∗
Evidence: Inspection 9.48% 29.31% 2.36% 15.18% ∗ ∗ ∗
Firm Characteristics
Plaintiff patentee (baseline: simple licensee) 97.68% 15.06% 95.54% 20.66% ∗ ∗ ∗
Defendant producer (baseline: trader) 54.79% 49.80% 43.88% 49.64% ∗ ∗ ∗
Only German parties involved 51.00% 50.02% 40.18% 49.04% ∗ ∗ ∗
German and Foreign parties involved 39.41% 48.89% 45.85% 49.84% ∗ ∗ ∗
Only Foreign parties involved 9.59% 29.46% 13.97% 34.68% ∗ ∗ ∗
Nr. of previous trials of plaintiff 12.97 40.65 22.11 54.08 ∗ ∗ ∗
Nr. of previous trials of defendant 1.47 4.91 3.09 8.83 ∗ ∗ ∗
Firm vs. firm 84.93% 35.79% 87.05% 33.58%
Firm vs. Individual 5.06% 21.93% 4.85% 21.48%
Individual vs. Firm 7.69% 26.66% 6.89% 25.33%
Individual vs. Individual 2.32% 15.06% 1.21% 10.94% ∗∗
Nr. plaintiffs 0.95 0.38 0.98 0.49 ∗∗
Nr. defendants 1.17 0.65 1.26 0.82 ∗ ∗ ∗
Patent stock plaintiff/defendant 1.49 25.06 15.57 246.70 ∗∗
Patent Characteristics
Family size 10.22 15.87 12.92 19.14 ∗ ∗ ∗
Patent breadth 1.83 1.19 2.01 1.33 ∗ ∗ ∗
Forward citations 6.27 13.44 8.40 16.50 ∗ ∗ ∗
Share self-forward citations 7.87% 23.36% 7.94% 23.04%
DPMA 30.87% 46.22% 27.87% 44.85%
DPMA-PCT 0.74% 8.56% 0.32% 5.64%
EPO 51.00% 50.02% 53.51% 49.89%
EPO-PCT 17.39% 37.92% 18.30% 38.68%
ElectricalEng 38.15% 48.60% 47.32% 49.94% ∗ ∗ ∗
Instruments 25.08% 43.37% 26.34% 44.06%
Chemistry 9.06% 28.72% 12.31% 32.86% ∗ ∗ ∗
ProcessEng 24.24% 42.87% 19.58% 39.69% ∗ ∗ ∗
MechanicalEng 24.55% 43.06% 17.73% 38.20% ∗ ∗ ∗
Consumption 14.44% 35.16% 11.67% 32.12% ∗∗
Age of patent at trial 11.21 4.84 11.64 5.16 ∗∗
14
4. Econometric Analysis
We estimate the likelihood of within trial settlement using a probit model that
distinguishes between settlement and adjudication of a litigation case. As the de-
cisions to litigate a patent and to settle litigation may be affected by unobserved
heterogeneity reflected in the correlation of the error terms of the latent litigation
decision and the latent settlement decision both decisions might be correlated.
Using a probit model with sample selection we try to take into account this un-
observed heterogeneity and correct the estimation procedure. Using patent value
indicators for explaining a likely selection we did not find that the selection into
litigation and the selection into settlement are significantly correlated. This result
justifies the use of a simple probit model and reflects both theoretical consider-
ations and empirical evidence stating that general measures of patent value are
already taken into account when choosing to not settle but to go to court. Therefore
patent value indicators no longer matter for the within-trial settlement decision.
The results of the selection model can be found in the robustness checks.
4.1. Full sample
Table 4 displays the results of the probit estimation of settlement as average
marginal effects. We have controlled for trial years, but do not display them in
the regression output due to limited space. We start by considering the first col-
umn. The first block of variables shows the effect of trial characteristics on the
settlement likelihood, the second block focuses on party characteristics and the
third block contains patent value measures.
Starting with the first set of hypotheses, focusing on how within-trial changes in
stakes and information affect the settlement likelihood, we find the following: A
one percent increase in the value at stake set by the judges leads to a 2.8 percent-
age point increase of the settlement likelihood. This result provides evidence for
hypothesis 1, stating that new information about stakes coming up during trial
reduces uncertainty and leads to a reevaluation of the case by the involved parties.
The same argument holds for the filing of a nullity suit during trial which increases
the settlement likelihood by 5.6 percentage points. The change in stakes coming
up during trial leads the parties to recalculate their litigation payoff and to come
to the conclusion that settlement might be the better option. On the contrary we
see that cases with a missing value at stake, indicating that these cases feature
generally low stakes for plaintiffs and defendants, settle significantly more often
than cases with a value at stake reported. This provides support for our conjec-
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ture that parties with generally low stakes are more likely to deviate from their
litigation strategy and agree upon a settlement deal.
The disclosure of new information invoked by the ordering of an external expert
by the judges significantly increases the settlement likelihood by ten percentage
points. The use of a witness does not have a significant effect. These results provide
support for hypothesis 2 regarding the effect of new information coming up dur-
ing trial on the likelihood of settlement. The reduction in information asymmetry
induced by the expert leads the two parties' levels of information to converge and
thus makes settlement more attractive.
Turning to the second set of hypotheses, dealing with firm-specific stakes and
strategies that influence the general willingness to settle or not, we find the follow-
ing: For cases involving plaintiffs being the patent owner or the exclusive licensee
settlement is 12.4 percentage points less likely than in cases involving simple li-
censees. Parties with higher stakes are less willing to deviate from their original
litigation strategy. The same holds for defendants: If the defendant is a producer
rather than a trader the settlement likelihood reduces by 6.7 percentage points.
This is consistent with our conjecture that stakes for producers are higher than
for traders as their production facility is adopted to a particular product line that
would have to be changed in case of a loss in trial. We further find that evidence
voluntarily presented by plaintiff or defendant in form of a document or an ob-
ject presented for inspection decreases the likelihood of settlement by 37 and 15
percentage points. Interpreting voluntarily providing evidence as signal of the con-
fidence of the parties we conclude that, if confidence is high, compensation via
settlement becomes more difficult and consequently cases are more likely to re-
sult in a final judgment. This result provides evidence in favour of hypothesis 3.
With respect to the choice of forum we find that cases heard in Düsseldorf are 31
percentage points less likely to settle than cases heard at the remaining 2 district
courts. As the choice of court is made by the plaintiff we interpret this as support
for hypothesis 5 stating that the plaintiffs determination to obtain a judgment on
the case makes settlement significantly less likely. Plaintiffs chosing the Düsseldorf
courts are less willing to deviate from their litigation strategy.
The control variables reveal the expected results. An increase in the number of
claims in trial reduces the settlement likelihood which can be attributed to in-
creased complexity of the case. Cases involving at least one foreign party settle
more likely than cases involving only German parties, which can be explained by
foreigners wanting to escape the complicated German jurisdiction. The number
of previous trials involving the defendant slightly increases the settlement proba-
bility. We find most common patent value indicators not to affect the settlement
likelihood. Cases involving patents originally filed at the DPMA however settle
more likely than cases originally filed at the EPO. We further find cases involv-
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ing instruments and mechanical engineering components to settle less likely and
chemistry patents to settle more likely than cases not located in these particular
technology areas.
So far we have applied a rather broad definition of settlement, defining all cases as
settlements that are not adjudicated. This definition also includes cases dropped
unilaterally by the plaintiff as well as cases dropped in agreement of the parties.
Given that interviews with specialized IP lawyers have revealed that parties often
drop the cases without notifying the court about a settlement deal, we can justify
this assumption. Nevertheless we conduct a robustness check that excludes the
dropped cases from our analysis and only keeps explicitly stated settled and adju-
dicated cases. This reduces the full sample to 2077 cases. The results can be found
in the second column of the regression output. The results are stable and vary only
little in magnitude. This makes us confident that our definition of settlement is
correct.
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Table 3: Probit full sample
Settle Settle strict
Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err.
Trial characteristics
Düsseldorf court (baseline: Munich) −0.309∗∗∗ (−6.66) −0.276∗∗∗ (−5.05)
Mannheim court (baseline: Munich) −0.044 (−0.96) −0.004 (−0.08)
Nr. of claims in trial −0.023∗∗∗ (−2.69) −0.019∗ (−1.96)
Nr. of previous trials involving patent 0.000 (0.20) 0.000 (0.37)
Nr. of patents in trial 0.040∗∗ (2.49) 0.045∗∗∗ (2.59)
ln(Value at stake) 0.028∗∗∗ (3.37) 0.029∗∗∗ (3.21)
Missing value at stake 0.301∗∗∗ (2.76) 0.327∗∗∗ (2.65)
Nullity suit 0.056∗∗∗ (2.87) 0.046∗∗ (2.10)
Evidence: Witness 0.061 (1.09) 0.061 (0.94)
Evidence: External expert 0.101∗∗ (2.50) 0.092∗∗ (2.03)
Evidence: Document −0.368∗∗∗ (−10.46) −0.372∗∗∗ (−9.33)
Evidence: Inspection −0.150∗∗∗ (−2.93) −0.200∗∗∗ (−3.26)
Firm characteristics
Plaintiff patentee (baseline: simple licensee) −0.124∗∗ (−2.35) −0.142∗∗ (−2.42)
Defendant producer (baseline: trader) −0.067∗∗∗ (−3.42) −0.046∗∗ (−2.04)
German and Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.065∗∗∗ (2.93) 0.067∗∗∗ (2.73)
Only Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.083∗∗ (2.46) 0.085∗∗ (2.25)
Nr. of previous trials of plaintiff 0.000 (0.27) −0.000 (−0.19)
Nr. of previous trials of defendant 0.004∗∗ (2.33) 0.006∗∗∗ (2.87)
Firm vs. firm 0.063 (0.76) 0.026 (0.27)
Firm vs. individual 0.070 (0.78) 0.023 (0.22)
Individual vs. firm 0.089 (1.12) 0.042 (0.45)
Nr. of plaintiff firms 0.018 (0.54) 0.037 (1.02)
Nr. of defendant firms 0.034∗∗ (2.13) 0.039∗∗ (2.26)
Relative patent stock plaintiff/defendant 0.000 (0.82) 0.000 (0.91)
Patent characteristics
Family size −0.000 (−0.37) −0.000 (−0.25)
Patent breadth 0.013 (0.85) 0.015 (0.85)
Forward citations −0.000 (−0.18) 0.001 (0.45)
Share self forward citations 0.019 (0.48) 0.025 (0.58)
DPMA-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.226∗ (−1.74) −0.260∗ (−1.67)
EPO (baseline: DPMA) −0.070∗∗∗ (−2.85) −0.036 (−1.28)
EPO-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.055∗ (−1.78) −0.036 (−1.04)
ElectricalEng 0.004 (0.13) −0.010 (−0.28)
Instruments −0.066∗∗ (−2.08) −0.078∗∗ (−2.14)
Chemistry 0.070∗ (1.89) 0.075∗ (1.81)
ProcessEng −0.046 (−1.48) −0.060∗ (−1.72)
MechanicalEng −0.082∗∗∗ (−2.59) −0.076∗∗ (−2.15)
Consumption −0.043 (−1.27) −0.045 (−1.17)
Age of patent at trial −0.004∗∗ (−2.06) −0.005∗∗ (−2.12)
Observations 2517 2077
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.2. Robustness Check: Firm subsample
In order to check the robustness of our main findings we control for firm size and
the relationship of the parties to each other. For this purpose we have matched
both plaintiffs and defendants to the firm databases Amadeus and Mannheim En-
terprise Panel. This allows us to control for the size of the plaintiff and defendant,
the relative size of the plaintiff compared to the defendant and for the firms being
active in the same or a different industry. Controlling for firm size might matter as
the firm's ability and willingness to settle is likely to depend on their size: Large
firms, for example, might have more interesting settlement agreements to offer
than smaller firms, such as cross-licesing deals. Industry overlap may be an indi-
cator of the counterparties' relationship to each other. Theoretical considerations
point in both directions: Some game theoretical models (Bernheim and Whinston
1990, Tirole 1994) predict that the expectation of repeated interaction increases
the incentive to settle disputes in a cooperative way. Given that being active in the
same industry increases the potential of repeated interaction one would expect an
increase in the settlement probability. At the same time an industry overlap may
indicate a higher degree of competition between the two parties as they are both
active in the same industry and deal with the same technology. This could lead to
a general tendency to be less willing to settle in order to hurt and discredit the
other party.
The subsample of cases for which at least one plaintiff and defendant could be
matched to the firm databases comprises 877 case observations. These cases fea-
ture at least one German or European firm at both the plaintiff and defendant
side. This subsample is not a representative subsample of our database, as it ex-
cludes both cases involving individuals and and non-European firms. The following
results are thus not directly comparable to the results of the full sample, but are
intended to evaluate the robustness of our previous findings.
We observe a settlement rate of 59.75 percent. Summary statics for the settled and
non-settled cases analoguosly to table 2 can be found in the appendix.
The estimation results provide support for most, but not all of our hypotheses.
When controlling for size and size differences we still find a positive and signif-
icant effect of an increase in the value at stake set by the judges. We no longer
find significant effects of the filing of a nullity suit. This result hints at the possi-
bility that European firms might be better acquainted with the German judicial
system and particularly the drawbacks associated with nullity suits in Germany
than foreigners. We do find changes in the informational setting induced by the
ordering of an expert opinion and even the questioning of a witness to significantly
increase the settlement likelihood by 19.8 percentage points. With respect to firm
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characteristics and strategies we find, as for the full sample, voluntarily presented
evidence to negatively affect the settlement likelihood. Presenting a document re-
duces the settlement likelihood by 49 percentage points and bringing an object for
inspection reduces the settlement likelihood by 15.4 percentage points. This robust
result provides strong evidence for hypothesis 3. Furthermore the settlement like-
lihood is significantly reduced by 43.4 percentage points when the case has been
filed in Düsseldorf compared to the other two courts, providing strong support for
the hypothesis of strategic forum choice by the plaintiff in order to obtain a final
judgment. This effect is much stronger for our subsample of European firms than
for the entire sample which may hint at these firms being particularly aware of
forum shopping possibilities. This strong effect may be an additional reason why
the filing of a nullity suit does no longer have a significant effect in the settlement
decision.
As effects of the control variables for firm size we find the number of employees of
the plaintiff firm to positively affect the settlement likelihood, but the relative size
of the plaintiff to negatively affect settlement. The larger the plaintiff the more
likely he will be interested in a settlement deal as he can offer more in a settlement
agreement. This effect may additionally be due to the fact that smaller plaintiffs
are particularly attached to their patent while larger firms rationally consider the
settlement option and might thus be more willing to deviate from their original
strategy. The larger the plaintiff compared to the defendant however the less likely
they will settle, which may be due to a large assymetry in stakes: If the plaintiff
knows that the settlement options are limited he might prefer an adjudication and
appropriate damages and will not reconsider settlement as a option. With respect
to plaintiff and defendant being active in the same industry we find no significant
effect on the settlement decision. We do not find support for either of the two pos-
sible effects which may be due to the fact that these consideration have already
taken place in the pre-trial negotiations and now no longer matter.
Column 2 displays the result when applying the more strict definition of settlement.
Again, the main results stay robust.
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Table 4: Probit settlement firm database subsample
Settle Settle strict
Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err.
Trial characteristics
Düsseldorf court (baseline: Munich) −0.434∗∗∗ (−3.94) −0.551∗∗∗ (−4.53)
Mannheim court (baseline: Munich) −0.151 (−1.39) −0.213∗ (−1.79)
Nr. of claims in trial −0.024 (−1.62) −0.008 (−0.53)
Nr. of previous trials involving patent 0.002 (1.12) 0.004 (1.62)
Nr. of patents in trial 0.077∗ (1.96) 0.063 (1.46)
ln(Value at stake) 0.027∗ (1.85) 0.039∗∗ (2.39)
Missing value at stake 0.283 (1.42) 0.482∗∗ (2.17)
Nullity suit 0.049 (1.51) 0.030 (0.82)
Evidence: Witness 0.221∗∗ (2.28) 0.259∗∗ (2.39)
Evidence: External expert 0.198∗∗∗ (3.06) 0.179∗∗∗ (2.61)
Evidence: Document −0.493∗∗∗ (−8.80) −0.519∗∗∗ (−8.12)
Evidence: Inspection −0.154∗ (−1.80) −0.239∗∗ (−2.36)
Firm characteristics
Plaintiff Patentee (baseline: simple licensee) −0.116 (−1.29) −0.159 (−1.64)
Defendant producer (baseline: trader) −0.050 (−1.51) −0.038 (−1.06)
German and Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.098∗∗ (2.56) 0.101∗∗ (2.46)
Only Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.186∗ (1.89) 0.212∗∗ (2.07)
Nr. of previous trials of plaintiff −0.001 (−0.79) −0.003 (−1.57)
Nr. of previous trials of defendant −0.003 (−0.60) −0.001 (−0.25)
Firm vs. firm 0.176 (1.57) 0.223∗ (1.71)
Firm vs. individual 0.165 (0.96) 0.181 (0.92)
Nr. of plaintiff firms 0.000 (0.01) 0.038 (0.73)
Nr. of defendant firms 0.031 (1.25) 0.039 (1.45)
Relative patent stock plaintiff/defendant 0.003 (0.80) 0.002 (0.79)
Employees defendant (in 1000) −0.000 (−0.04) −0.000 (−0.09)
Employees plaintiff (in 1000) 0.002∗∗ (2.45) 0.003∗∗∗ (2.80)
Relative size plaintiff/defendant −0.000∗∗ (−1.98) −0.000∗∗ (−2.10)
Same industry −0.019 (−0.61) 0.000 (0.00)
Family size 0.001 (0.18) 0.001 (0.44)
Patent breadth −0.020 (−0.67) −0.020 (−0.62)
Patent characteristics
Forward citations −0.002 (−0.70) 0.000 (0.11)
Share self forward citations −0.023 (−0.36) −0.041 (−0.58)
DPMA-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.249 (−1.50) −0.128 (−0.74)
EPO (baseline: DPMA) −0.095∗∗ (−2.46) −0.074∗ (−1.76)
EPO-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.082 (−1.58) −0.076 (−1.33)
ElectricalEng 0.038 (0.74) 0.017 (0.30)
Instruments −0.018 (−0.35) −0.015 (−0.26)
Chemistry 0.112∗ (1.67) 0.112 (1.56)
ProcessEng 0.018 (0.36) 0.010 (0.17)
MechanicalEng 0.002 (0.04) 0.040 (0.71)
Consumption 0.018 (0.34) 0.040 (0.68)
Age of patent at trial −0.005 (−1.37) −0.006 (−1.64)
Observations 876 737
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.3. Robustness Check: Controlling for Selection into Litigation
As another robustness check we estimate a probit model with sample selection for
estimating the determinants of within-trial settlement in order to control for the
fact that the cases going to trial are not a random sample of all patents in force. 8
This model represents the settlement decision as a two-stage decision. The first
stage models the decision to take a particular patent to court while the second
stage then models the decision to settle during court proceedings or to adjudicate
the case. Litigation and within-trial settlement may be affected by unobserved
heterogeneity reflected in the correlation of the error terms of the latent selection
equation and the latent settlement equation. In that case both equations might
contain some common omitted variable and the error terms would be correlated.
Using a probit model with sample selection we can take into account this unob-
served heterogeneity and correct the estimation procedure. In order to compare the
sample of litigated patents to the overall population of non-litigated patents valid
in Germany we construct a control group using case cohort sampling. We stratify
the control group by application filing year and application type, distinguishing
between applications at the German Patent Office and the European Patent Office
and between PCT-route applications and non-PCT- applications. We make sure
only granted patents are included as non-granted patents have a probability of
zero of ever being litigated in an infringement case. Our sampling method guaran-
tees a coverage of the same time and application type structure as in the sample
of litigated patents. We purposely do not draw the control group by IPC classes
as has been done in the literature in order to be able to identify litigation and
settlement differences by technology areas. 9However, over sampling by a factor of
ten ensures that all 4-digit IPC classes contained in the sample of litigated patents
appear at least once in the control group. 10 For the analysis we used a control
sample of 22451 non-litigated patents. Table 5 displays the estimation results of
the probit model with sample selection. The dependent variable is settlement in
the outcome equation and litigation in the selection equation.
As with the regular Heckman model we need an exclusion restriction that has
a significant effect in the first stage of the regression (litigation), no significant
effect in the second stage (settlement) and that is correlated with the error term
of the second stage. We choose the two patent value indicators family size and
8 This type of model is well explained e.g. in Dubin and Rivers (1989).
9 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Cremers (2007) for different control group
approaches.
10 The coverage of all four digit IPC classes contained in the litigation data has been
verified.
22
patent breadth as exclusion restrictions in our selection equation as theoretical
considerations suggest that the patent value as such should have an impact on the
patent's likelihood of litigation, but not on the decision to settle a court case. The
problem here is that settlement is conditional on litigation so that a direct test
cannot be conducted. We therefore conduct a test that can serve as indicator of the
appropriateness of the exclusion restrictions. We run a regular probit model for
settlement and include the two exclusion restrictions. The exclusion restrictions
are both jointly and separately insignificantly different from zero at the usual
significance levels. We therefore use these two variables as exclusion restrictions.
The results of the selection model can be found in table 6 and 7. The Wald test
of independence of the selection equation and settlement equation does not reject
independence at any common significance level. The use of the selection model
is thus not necessary. The fact that we find no selection bias supports previous
results that suggest that within trial settlement can not be explained by simple
patent value indicators, but rather by factors representing the value of the patent
for the very firms involved.
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Table 5: Outcome equation selection model : Settlement
Coefficient Std. Err.
Trial characteristics
Düsseldorf court (baseline: Munich) −0.931∗∗∗ (−6.52)
Mannheim court (baseline: Munich) −0.136 (−0.98)
Nr. of claims in trial −0.068∗∗∗ (−2.65)
Nr. of previous trials involving patent 0.000 (0.10)
Nr. of patents in trial 0.120∗∗ (2.50)
ln(Value at stake) 0.083∗∗∗ (3.37)
Missing value at stake 0.908∗∗∗ (2.76)
Nullity suit 0.168∗∗∗ (2.85)
Evidence: Witness 0.183 (1.09)
Evidence: External Expert 0.303∗∗ (2.49)
Evidence: Document −1.103∗∗∗ (−9.81)
Evidence: Inspection −0.454∗∗∗ (−2.94)
Firm characteristics
Plaintiff patentee (baseline: simple licensee) −0.380∗∗ (−2.40)
Defendant producer (baseline: trader) −0.202∗∗∗ (−3.40)
German and Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.197∗∗∗ (2.99)
Only Foreign parties involved (baseline: only Germans) 0.258∗∗ (2.53)
Nr. of previous trials of plaintiff 0.001 (0.42)
Nr. of previous trials of defendant 0.013∗∗ (2.42)
Firm vs. firm 0.183 (0.74)
Firm vs. individual 0.206 (0.76)
Individual vs. firm 0.268 (1.12)
Nr. of plaintiff firms 0.056 (0.55)
Nr. of defendant firms 0.101∗∗ (2.12)
relative patent srtock plaintiff/defendant 0.000 (0.82)
Patent characteristics
Forward citations 0.002 (0.23)
Share self forward citations 0.074 (0.57)
DPMA-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.650∗ (−1.66)
EPO (baseline: DPMA) −0.210∗∗∗ (−2.86)
EPO-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.163∗ (−1.74)
ElectricalEng 0.069 (0.90)
Instruments −0.158∗∗ (−2.00)
Chemistry 0.239∗∗ (2.19)
ProcessEng −0.088 (−1.15)
MechanicalEng −0.201∗∗ (−2.57)
Consumption −0.075 (−0.74)
Age of patent at trial −0.012∗ (−1.95)
Constant 0.307 (0.58)
athrho 0.056 (0.33)
Observations 24967
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
24
Table 6: Selection equation selection model: Litigation
Coefficient Std. Err.
Patent characteristics
Forward citations 0.060∗∗∗ (23.70)
Share self forward citations 0.414∗∗∗ (8.32)
DPMA-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.044 (−0.27)
EP (baseline: DPMA) −0.048∗ (−1.75)
EP-PCT (baseline: DPMA) −0.007 (−0.18)
ElectricalEng −0.012 (−0.32)
Instruments −0.168∗∗∗ (−4.44)
Chemistry −0.590∗∗∗ (−12.97)
ProcessEng −0.019 (−0.51)
MechanicalEng −0.139∗∗∗ (−3.55)
Consumption 0.230∗∗∗ (5.25)
Family size 0.025∗∗∗ (11.56)
Patent breadth 0.101∗∗∗ (5.22)
Constant −1.588∗∗∗ (−45.05)
Observations 2517
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5. Conclusion
In this paper we conducted an analysis of patent litigation settlement after trial
has been initiated, focusing on within-trial changes in information and stakes and
taking into account the case-specific stakes and strategies of the plaintiff and de-
fendant.
We were able to identify three events during trial that change the pre-trial infor-
mational basis of the involved parties and the corresponding stakes in the case.
These are the emergence of new information about the stakes revealed through
the setting of the jurisdictional value of the case by the judge, changes in stakes
induced by the filing of a nullity suit as an act of defense of the defendant, and
the availability of new information on win probabilities through the ordering of an
expert opinion by the judges.
The setting of the jurisdictional value of the case by the judges generally informs
parties about the judge's estimation of the importance and value of their dispute.
The higher the value of the case the higher the potential costs to be paid when
losing in trial, which makes settlement even more attractive. As court costs only
reflect the tip of the iceberg of the direct trial costs, of which lawyer costs make up
the lion's share, the relatively small influence of this effect (3 percentage points)
is not surprising.
More importantly, the filing of a nullity suit is an event changing the stakes in the
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case that have been assumed by plaintiff and defendant prior to trial. Suddenly,
the plaintiff faces the possibility of losing his monopoly right. This severe threat
induces him to reconsider settlement as an option that enables him to secure his
monopoly right and share the market with the defendant instead of potentially
having to share his technology with everyone else. As expected the settlement like-
lihood increases with the filing of a nullity suit.
Third, the sheer availablity of detailed new information through an expert's per-
spective on the case makes the counterparties' estimates of their chances in trial
converge, thereby increasing the settlement rate by about ten percentage points.
These findings stress how trial proceedings, aimed at helping the judges to deliver
a reasonable judgment, can trigger settlement agreements by promoting the disclo-
sure of information not only valuable to the judges, but also to the involved parties.
This result is robust across all different specifications. Given that experts opinions
seem to have a positive impact on settlement our results suggest that permanently
available experts at the district courts would lead to more predictable judgments
and thus to more settlement in the long run. Given that settlements are desirable
from a welfare point of view the enhanced training of judges and experts should
be forced and considered in creating the new European patent court.
In addition to analyzing trial-specific actions that trigger settlement we are also
able to shed light on firm's general willingness to consider settlement during trial.
Given the availability of data on the relation of the plaintiffs and defendants to
the patent and indicators of their strategies in the case, we find parties with high
stakes, high confidence and the determination to obtain a stable judgment to be
less likely to deviate from their litigation strategy than less determined parties
with a lower interest in a clear judgment. Higher stakes of plaintiff and defendant,
measured by the plaintiff being patentee or exclusive licensee and the defendant
being a producer rather than trader, lead the parties to stick to their adjdication
strategy. A high confidence as measured by the voluntary provision of evidence in
court makes parties settle less likely as compensation in a settlement agreement
becomes more difficult with one party being quite certain about their prevailing in
trial: They will demad a high settlement amount that the other party might not
be willing to pay. Finally the choice of Düsseldorf as forum for litigation signifi-
catly reduces the settlement likelihood. Given that this court is widely recognized
as delivering very stable and reiable judgments parties wanting to obtain such a
judgment will choose this forum. This type of plaintiffs, that might for example
need to obtain a judgment to clarify their competitive standing, will not easily
deviate from their strategy to obtain a judgment.
These results confirm conjectures that it is not simple patent value measures, but
rather the firm's particular interest in a setting that can explain why parties do or
do not settle after all. Further research should therefore try to gather even more
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information about the constellation of plaintiffs and defendants in litigation cases.
Regarding the robustness of our results we find that the results remain stable when
adopting a more strict definition of settlement that disregards dropped cases. This
indicates that the definition of settlement applied and supported by patent lawyers
is correct.
When considering firm size and size differences between plaintiff and defendant
(which can be done only for German and European firms) most, but not all of or
hypotheses still receive support. We no longer find a significant effect of the filing
of a nullity suit on the settlement likelihood. One possible reason for this may be
that European and German firms are more familiar with the nullity procedures in
Germany and know that a patent is declared invalid in only a very small share of
cases. This might make this thread less effective. We also no longer find a signifi-
cant effect of the variables trying to capture the stakes of plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiff patentees and defendants being producers are no longer significantly less
likely to settle than other firms. This may be because other factors are more impor-
tant for European firms such that this effect perishes. We find that particularly the
forum choice by the plaintiff matters a lot more for this firm subsample: While the
choice of the Düsseldorf court increases the settlement likelihood by 31 percentage
points in the full sample the effect is 43 percentage points in the subsample of
European firms. All other relevant effects remain stable across all specifications
and samples.
Finally, the use of a probit model with sample selection incorporating the selection
into litigation through measures of patent value is shown to not be necessary as
the litigation and settlement equation are not significantly correlated.
There are of course shortcomings to this paper. Our findings that the litigation and
settlement decision are not related is only true for the patent-related factors that
we observed. The ideal approach would be to look at both, the litigation and set-
tlement decision, from a firm-level constellation approach. This would require firm
level data for all pairs of firms that could potentially end up in litigation with each
other, which is a very difficult undertaking. A further improvement could concern
including the timing of the different events during the trial proceedings, such that
the updating of information and changes in stakes can be analyzed in more detail.
Further projects aimed at gathering trial data on litigation suits are encouraged
to go into more detail. Research on the firm level could reveal whether there exist
strategies within firms which would lead to more settlement for some firms and
less for others. Furthermore, analyzing the unique form of alleged infringement in
certain technologies could explain different litigation strategies.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Appendix A: The patent litigation system in Germany: Legal rules and pro-
cedures
For a granted patent a first possibility to be involved in a dispute is an opposition
procedure right after the grant of the patent. This procedure takes place if a third
party, usually a competitor, argues that the patent should not have been granted
(Article 99 EPC, Paragraph 59 PatG). Opposition procedures take place at the
DPMA or EPO opposition divisions. A granted patent, coming from a German
Patent application or from a Germany-designated EPO application, becomes na-
tional law. The German system separated validity and infringement proceedings.
While invalidity decisions are rendered by the German Patent Court, infringement
are cases are dealt with by the district courts. In Germany there are twelve District
courts qualified for dealing with patent infringement cases. The legal procedures
are set in the Code for Civil Procedures (ZPO). Other than in most types of ac-
tions in patent infringement cases the involved parties are relatively free to choose
the venue. The plaintiff can choose between either the jurisdiction of the defendant
or the court in the jurisdiction where the potential infringement has taken place.
Once suspecting an infringement and having obtained some evidence the patentee
can send an official warning to the infringer (caution), asking him to stop infringing
the patented invention and to provide a legally binding "cease and desist" decla-
ration. If the defendant does not react, the plaintiff may file a suit. The defendant
may however file a counterclaim asking for the declaration of non-infringement in
order to have his position confirmed. In order to avoid such an action for a negative
declaratory judgment, the patentee can chose to send an inquiry asking the other
party about the legitimacy of their actions. In some urgent cases, a preliminary
injunction is applied for when the suspected infringing party is about to start sell-
ing a product involving the disputed technology and when substantial losses for
the patent owner may result. There will be a defense plea and then a reply to the
defense plea, which may again be followed by a rejoinder. These proceeding then
lead to an oral hearing before court and may be continued as written procedures
or followed by further oral hearings until the publication of the final judgment.
It is the responsibility of the parties to provide evidence in favor or against the
case, and the court does not conduct any investigations on its own. If the three
judges decide that they are unable to assess technical questions, they will appoint
a technical expert, who submits a report and is present at the oral hearings. Both
parties may then comment on the expert's opinion. The appointment of an expert
opinion usually delays the procedure by about 9 to 12 months. A common defense
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procedure of the defendant is to file nullity procedure at the German Patent court.
While in other countries nullity issues are dealt with by the same court as infringe-
ment issues, the German bifurcation system separates these issues. A nullity suit
as such therefore does not directly interfere with the infringement suit. If however
the district court does suspect an infringement of the patent, but at the same time
suspects the patent to be judged invalid by the German Patent court, it will defer
the infringement action until the nullity case has been resolved. In the majority
of cases however the decision regarding nullity is rendered after the termination of
the infringement proceedings. Patent infringement procedures can terminate with
a judgment, a judgment by default, a within- court or out-of-court settlement or
with a withdrawal of the case. The losing party is obliged to pay the attorney fees
of the winning party, the court costs and any further expenses. The attorney and
court fees are being calculated according to a formula based on the estimated value
of the dispute. 11
6.2. Appendix B: 21 industry codes derived from the 2-digit revision 2 NACE
codes
A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing
B - Mining and quarrying
C - Manufacturing
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste managment and remediation activities
F - Construction
G - Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H - Transporting and storage
I - Accommodation and food service activities
J - Information and communication
K - Financial and insurance activities
L - Real estate activities
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities
N - Administrative and support service activities
O - Public administration and defense; compulsory social security
P - Education
Q - Human health and social work activities
R - Arts, entertainment and recreation
11 In an appeal case court costs increase about 15% and appeals at the Federal Supreme
court are twice as high as the first instance proceedings (Bardehle Pahlenberg 2010, p.
13).
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S - Other services activities
T - Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods - and services
U - Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies
6.3. Appendix C: Descriptives of the firm subsample
No Settlement (N=353) Settlement (N=524)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev ttest
Trial characteristics
Nr. claims trial 3.65 1.13 3.73 1.25
Nr. trials involving patent 4.42 25.45 9.06 37.87 ∗∗
Nr. patents in trial 1.10 0.33 1.23 0.69 ∗∗
ln(value at stake) 10.56 4.92 11.59 4.13 ∗ ∗ ∗
Missing value at stake 17.00% 37.61% 10.11% 30.18% ∗ ∗ ∗
Nullity suit 35.69% 47.98% 39.69% 48.97% ∗ ∗ ∗
Evidence: Witness 3.40% 18.15% 3.05% 17.22%
Evidence: External Expert 4.53% 20.83% 8.02% 27.18% ∗∗
Evidence: document 26.35% 44.11% 7.44% 26.27% ∗ ∗ ∗
Evidence: Inspection 10.48% 30.68% 2.67% 16.14% ∗ ∗ ∗
Firm characteristics
Same industry 44.19% 49.73% 41.03% 49.24%
Employees plaintiff 5865.06 25543.43 11618.93 37947.45 ∗ ∗ ∗
Employees defendant 2053.54 12903.42 2417.86 14701.03
Employees plaintiff/defendant 1110.16 11045.29 1493.74 12733.11
Plaintiff patentee (baseline: simple licensee) 97.17% 16.61% 96.37% 18.71%
Defendant producer (baseline: trader) 60.34% 48.99% 53.44% 49.93% ∗∗
Only German parties involved 71.95% 44.99% 59.35% 49.16% ∗ ∗ ∗
German and Foreign parties involved 25.78% 43.80% 35.50% 47.90% ∗ ∗ ∗
Only Foreign parties involved 2.27% 14.90% 5.15% 22.13% ∗∗
Nr. of previous trials of plaintiff 9.36 33.96 16.95 51.28 ∗ ∗ ∗
Nr. of previous trials of defendant 1.18 3.45 1.82 4.80 ∗∗
Firm vs. firm 94.05% 23.69% 96.76% 17.73% ∗
Firm vs. Individual 1.42% 11.83% 1.53% 12.27%
Individual vs. Firm 4.25% 20.20% 1.72% 13.00% ∗∗
Individual vs. Individual 0.28% 5.32% 0.00% 0.00%
Nr. plaintiffs 1.00 0.32 1.11 0.62 ∗ ∗ ∗
Nr. defendants 1.26 0.62 1.31 0.70
Patent stock plaintiff/defendant 0.49 2.57 2.58 27.20 ∗
Patent characteristics
Family size 6.76 10.04 8.44 13.27 ∗∗
Patent breadth 1.66 0.96 1.75 1.10
Forward citations 4.67 9.79 5.69 12.03
Share self-forward citations 8.55% 24.35% 7.69% 23.66%
DPMA 38.24% 48.67% 38.93% 48.81%
DPMA-PCT 1.70% 12.94% 0.57% 7.55%
EPO 43.34% 49.63% 43.13% 49.57%
EPO-PCT 16.71% 37.36% 17.37% 37.92%
ElectricalEng 35.13% 47.80% 40.27% 49.09%
Instruments 23.80% 42.64% 22.14% 41.56%
Chemistry 7.65% 26.62% 11.07% 31.40% ∗
ProcessEng 24.36% 42.99% 23.85% 42.66%
MechanicalEng 29.46% 45.65% 25.19% 43.45%
Consumption 15.01% 35.77% 13.93% 34.66%
Age of patent at trial 10.48 4.92 10.65 5.36
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